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RULE-MAKING AND THE POLICEt
Carl McGowan*
I.

INTRODUCTION

remarkable man, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in whose
name and by whose providence we are met on this occasion, had
many profound perceptions about the nature of law-making. Except
for the violence of the Civil War in his youth, his life was largely
lived at a time and in a society which seem simple and benevolent by
comparison with our own. Some of his generalizations, nevertheless,
continue to define accurately the limitations under which we confront the complexities presently assailing us on every side. This is
notably true of the administration of criminal justice.
In the second of the landmark lectures in which Holmes explored
the nature and development of the common law, he addressed himself to the jurisprudence of crimes, and his initial premise was stated
in these terms: "The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that
it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the
community, right or wrong ... .'11 This derives from the broad principle which emerged from Holmes's survey of the entire corpus of
the common law, namely, that although judicial lawmaking in form
purports to be logical, its substance is legislative in the sense of being
compounded of "considerations of what is expedient for the community concemed."2 And these considerations, in tum, are "the
unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions" which shape the dominant views of public policy at any one
point in time.3
It is undoubtedly true, as Holmes said, that no formulation of
legal rules, in the criminal law or elsewhere, can be effective to the
degree that it is at cross-purposes with the beliefs and expectations of
the community. But one difficulty in applying this standard lies in
the accurate identification of what the prevailing consensus of those
beliefs and expectations is. It would be hard indeed, in the current
clamor about law and order, to make that identification with any
confidence or precision. Further, we as a people are not given to ac-
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t The text is that of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise Lectures in the form in
which they were delivered at The University of Michigan on November 15-16, 1971.
• Member of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. A.B. 1932, Dartmouth College; LL.B. 1936, Columbia University.-Ed.
1. 0. Hou.ms, THE COMMON I.Aw 41 (1938).
2. Id. at 36.
3. Id. at 36.
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cepting as sacrosanct and immutable a transient opinion-poll consensus about any important public policy which we believe to be
grounded in error and ignorance. We have always accorded to law
an educative, as well as a regulatory, function; and, if the law cannot lead, it cannot instruct.
All three of the main segments of the administration of criminal
justice today-law enforcement officers, judges, correctional officials
-are caught in the focus of these tensions. They are exacerbated by
a seemingly endless rise in the volume of crime, which creates understandable fears and stirs strong passions, and which overtaxes the
resources currently allocated to its prevention and control. They are
envenomed by our unexpiated heritage of racism and enflamed by
our national fascination with violence. We are, in respect of crime,
deep in a sea of troubles for which there are no instant or simplistic
solutions.
One who undertakes to talk about even a very narrow aspect of
criminal justice perhaps owes it to his audience as well as himself to
state the major reflections which his exposure to the criminal field
has induced. That exposure, I hasten to say, has been solely that of
an appellate judge, and has of necessity been a very restricted one.
I have not been a victim of crime; and neither have I prosecuted or
defended a typical criminal case or walked the beat with a policeman. I do not even see the defendants whose appeals I hear. My
range of vision is confined to the cold records of criminal trials. Although I have seen what seems like an infinite number of them, my
observation point is both fixed as to angle and remote in space and
time from the actual happenings and from the people involved in
them.
These are very real limitations upon the validity of generalization
in this area of the law. But, as Justice Holmes wrote to his friend Sir
Frederick Pollock, " ... the chief end of man is to frame general
propositions and ... no general proposition is worth a damn." 4 It
is in that spirit that the following reflections are laid before you, not
as demonstrable truths but as perhaps illuminative of the point of
departure for the central subject of these lectures.
First, I find little evidence to suggest that what the courts do by
way of doctrine bears any significant relationship to the level of
crime.5 Especially is this true of the kinds of crime which are at the
4. 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK I..ErrERS 59 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
5. Dean Wigmore's view of the consequences of the exclusionary rule reflects a
differing perception: "[T]he always watchful forces of criminality, fraud, anarchy and
law evasion perceived the advantage and made vigorous use of it." 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2184a n.l, at 31 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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center of our present concern. Had there never been a so-called Warren Court, it is hardly to be supposed that a dismaying growth in the
volume of crime throughout the postwar years would thereby have
been avoided. The typical criminal appellant before our court does
not appear to determine his course of conduct by reference to judicial decisions. It is fixed, rather, by racial discrimination, bad housing, ineffective education, underemployment, and all the related ills
which characterize our unbalanced social structure. Crime will go
down as these conditions are attacked at their roots. It will continue
to go up as our efforts and our dollars are directed to other objectives.
Second, it may be true to some extent that the level of crime is
affected by the efficiency of the law enforcement process, including
most notably the time it takes from arrest to final disposition. Whatever may be the maximum potential of the criminal process for deterrence, it surely diminishes as delay makes that process unreal.
Merely speeding up the functioning of the criminal courts is no
single panacea for the prevention of crime, but there are values in
doing so which comprehend, at least in some measure, the objectives
of deterrence. We should strive to this end with all the imagination
and ingenuity we have, ~ven though that effort should be made
under no delusion that efficient courts offer anything like a total
solution of the criminal problem.
Third, there is insufficient grasp of the fact that crime is various
in its manifestations, and does not lend itself easily to our ideal of
uniform rules applying across the board. The member of the Mafia
bears little resemblance to the nineteen-year old public school dropout, or to the black who cannot get a job because of his color. The
political crimes, which have grown greatly in the wake of the dissatisfactions of privileged as well as underprivileged members of society with various aspects of modem life, have little or nothing in
common with the ordinary housebreaking or street mugging. The
antitrust or securities fraud defendant, the colorless clerk of years of
respectability who is suspected of murdering his wife, present problems quite unlike other defendants. The victimless offenses of alcoholism, gambling, prostitution, and sexual aberration are a world
unto themselves.
Despite these differences, we try to design a criminal process of
enforcement, adjudication, and correction which is uniform in its
rules. And the ultimate standard for testing those rules is a Bill of
Rights which, both in its terms and in its origins, was heavily preoccupied with the purely political oppressions which rebellious colonials thought to see in their governance by the mother country.
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It is, thus, no occasion for surprise that against this background,
with its mixture of causes, proscriptions, and superstitions, it has
been difficult to achieve Holmes's "first requirement of a sound body
of law," namely, correspondence with the actual feelings and demands of the community. We are many communities, not one; and
we confront a bewildering variety of criminal activities, some of
which arguably are not ·wisely to be dealt with at all in a criminal
context. We are, in any event, massively involved with crime in this
country today, and efforts to deal with it through the application of
law are blunted to the extent that Holmes's "first requirement" is
not met. My purpose in these lectures is to explore one means by
which it is conceivable, although far from certain, that we could
make some progress in that direction.
A common and recurring complaint on too many sides is that the
police, in their efforts to prevent and to detect crime, are shackled
by restrictive and unrealistic judicial mandates. This view, not unnaturally, is perhaps most widely held by the police themselves, but
it is also shared by a large number of that community whose respect
for legal formulations is essential to their efficacy. Not only laymen,
but also many trained in the law, assert that the courts have verged
too widely from their essential function of determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
In the process, so it is said, standards of law enforcement are imposed which subordinate this function to other objectives, related
neither to the central mission of the courts nor to anything which,
in the nature of things, they actually know much about. The result
is that the law enforcers and the adjudicators are locked in angry
controversy while the guilty assertedly thrive. A considerable body
of public opinion, shaped by the justified fear of seeing our cities
turned into lawless jungles, tends to regard the law, as laid down by
the courts, to be out of joint. This generates demands for changes
in it which are not necessarily in the public interest, and which
would only impede or turn back our progress towards an increasingly civilized social order.
My last impression, gleaned from several years of reading trial
records at the appellate stage, is that the police are at the very core
of any purpose to achieve that progress. Neither the prosecutors, nor
the courts, nor the correctional officials, can operate effectively if the
police function is not of the highest professional character. Moreover, millions of people who never end up in the formal criminal
process are closely affected in their daily lives by the quality of the
police performance. There is, thus, every reason why the police
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should move into the central focus of our effort to create a sound
body of criminal law and to achieve both fairness and effectiveness
in the administration of criminal justice.
There is much that the police need. They have too long and too
often been among the stepchildren of our society, denied the interest and attention to which the importance of their work entitled
them. Today, when they are increasingly critical to our very safety,
we are reaping the harvest of long years of neglect. Those years were
marked by vague disapproval of police work as a career in which a
bright and ambitious young man should be interested. There was a
monumental lack of concern with how they were being recruited
and trained, and how much they were paid. We were quite content
to think about them not at all until some crisis arose when we insisted that they perform like supermen, after which we reverted to
our former attitudes of massive disinterest and mild distaste.
If the current preoccupations with rising crime rates do nothing
else, surely they will generate a conviction that the state of the police,
like the state of the medical arts, is the continuous business of every
citizen. When we are ready to support and encourage as well as to
criticize, then may we plausibly insist that the police operation be
a highly professional one, guided by goals other than the single one
of producing an arrestee for every crime logged on the station house
books.
II.

EXTERNAL PRESCRIPTION AND INDIRECT SANCTION

The subject of this discourse is the role of the police in criminal
rule-making. This has reference, of course, not to the rules of the
substantive criminal law, but to the procedural rules of law enforcement operations.6 This subject, though narrow in terms, is inseparable from the central question which has immemorially challenged
the criminal law and which has become acute in the present climate
of rising crime. That overriding issue is, of course, the problem of
how to enforce the criminal law effectively without sacrificing the
rights and freedoms of the individual.7
6. Although our theory of government leaves the making of the substantive criminal
law exclusively to the legislature, the police do in fact have a very real, though essentially negative, role in fashioning our substantive criminal law through their power
of selective and discretionary law enforcement. For an excellent analysis of the problems
and parameters of the discretionary enforcement of the criminal law, see K. DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JusnCE 80-96 (1969). What Professor Davis laments about selective law
enforcement is not so much its existence as its invisibility, and it is in this context that
he most vigorously urges the formulation and publication of rules by the police.
7. The concept of a constant dialectic tension in our system of criminal justice
between the objectives of efficient law enforcement and the maximization of due process
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The current tension between the law as stated by the courts and
what the public finds acceptable is perhaps not due so much to pop•
ular disagreement with the importance of individual rights. It may
rather be a consequence of the failure by many people, including
judges, to appreciate fully the critical significance of the police to
any practical resolution of the matter. Heretofore it would seem that
our methods of providing civil protections have, contrarily, discounted that significance, as witness the fact that rules designed to
protect the individual from police misconduct have typically originated in other quarters than the police.
There is a new and growing interest, however, in shifting the
formulation of rules in the first instance to the police themselves.8
And there are some isolated signs of a readiness on the part of the
police to undertake this step in the direction of self-regulation. If
this proves to be more than a fleeting phenomenon, it could be quite
meaningful for the entire structure of criminal justice, including
not only greater fairness in its administration but also a healthier
climate of public respect for the manner in which the system works.
Perhaps I can best give the matter concrete and meaningful contours by relating an experience we have recently had on our court.
We have been plagued, as have all courts with criminal jurisdiction,
with the problem of identification evidence. In a dismayingly high
percentage of the criminal appeals which come to us, the prosecution's case rests solely on identification testimony. This is not said
critically of police or prosecutor, because the fact is that, in many of
the criminal episodes which are causing the greatest public concern
today, there is no way to proceed except by the route of identification. The yoking on the street is rarely observed by anyone but the
victim, the fleeing of the scene is usually accomplished successfully
by the bandit, and, if the malefactor is eventually caught, the stolen
ten-dollar bill is no longer in his possession. The police have no way
to begin their investigation except by exhibiting to the victim pholiberties has become an established analytical framework for most scholars in this field.
See Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964).
8. See, e.g., ABA PROJECl' ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusnCE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE POLICE FUNC11ON (Tentative Draft, Oct. 1971); K. DAVIS, supra note 6,
at 80-96; NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMlllN, ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 164-65 (1968); PRESI•
DENT'S CoM:MN. ON LA.W ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusnCE, THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 103-06 (1967); Id., TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 13~1
(1967); Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases,
45 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 785, 810 (1970); Caplan, The Police Legal Advisor, 58 J. CRIM, L.C. &:
P.S. 303 (1967); Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A. Proposal for Improving Police
Performance, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1123 (1967).
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tographs in their files which might conceivably include the guilty
person.
If the victim picks out a photograph from those shown to him,
the subject of the photograph is arrested and charged. If trial is to
proceed under these circumstances alone, the case consists of an incourt identification of the defendant by the victim, supported by the
latter's testimony as to his opportunity to observe at the time of the
commission of the crime and of his subsequent selection of the defendant's photograph from the array presented to him. The weaknesses of identification testimony need not be recounted, since each
of us knows from his own experience in a noncriminal context how
difficult it is to be certain that the person we have seen only fleetingly is the one we encounter later. Juries tend to be unimpressed
with this kind of evidence, and the acquittal rate is not inconsiderable in cases where it alone constitutes the government's case.
An additional element of certainty can be added, however, by
testimony that the eyewitness has picked the defendant out of a formal lineup. That represents no assurance of guilt, but, in a situation
traditionally fraught with the perils of mistake, it is the best that can
be done, especially since the Supreme Court has added the presence
of counsel for the suspect to the protections under which the suspect
appears in a formal lineup.9 The Court has not as yet held that a
lineup must be held in every case; it has said only that, if a lineup
is held, the defendant must have had counsel present if evidence of
the resulting identification is to be received.
In the case of which I speak, the eyewitnesses did, following the
crime, select the defendant's photograph from among two separate
sets shown to them, first immediately after the crime, and again the
day before trial. No formal lineup was ever held, even though there
was ample time for doing so. The defendant urged upon us that the
failure to hold a lineup should, without more, invalidate his conviction as a matter of constitutional due process. An alternative theory
pressed was that, under the circumstances here involved, the showing of the photographs on the eve of trial became a critical stage of
the prosecution which required the presence of defendant's counsel.
What is interesting and perhaps unique about this case is that an
adoption of either of the defendant's theories would follow upon the
promulgation by the police department in question of a rule that,
despite the identification of the defendant by means of a photo9. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). See also United States v. Simmons,
390 U.S. 377 (1968); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
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graphic exhibition immediately after the crime, the arresting officer
acting on this identification must promptly make arrangements for
a formal lineup.
This rule had not been issued until after the events had taken
place in the case before us, but it appears to be both a laudable and
a sensible effort by the police not only to protect the innocent but
to strengthen the case against the guilty. Its recognition could be
characterized as not a self-conceived prescription by the judiciary but
a reinforcement of a self-denying ordinance voluntarily imposed by
.the police on themselves. No judicial decision required them to do
it. It was simply a step taken in the exercise of good judgment as to
how a police department should function in the public interest,
which comprehends both an interest in fairness to the accused and
in convicting the guilty.
Justice Holmes would, I suggest, regard this police rule as a palpable contribution to the achievement of his "first requirement" of
a sound body of law. His only question might be whether evidentiary exclusion should play any role at all under these circumstances,
assuming that the police rule is not likely to be withdrawn and that
the police command will rigorously enforce it by appropriate disciplinary action against members of the force who disregard it.
In any event, the issuance of this rule has been a heartening development. It might well not have happened if the police chief had
not acted some time ago to create a General Counsel and accompanying legal staff serving only the Police Department. The rule in question was drafted by this unit, and it represents a la'wyer-like response
to an operational problem, formulated after that problem has been
examined in all its aspects, including the practical feasibility of the
prescribed rule of conduct. This is the way la'wyers do, and are expected to, function in relation to the affairs of private clients; and
the needs of the police in this respect are no less pressing. I have said
heretofore that
[i]magination and innovation, soundly conceived in relation to specific problems, need not be the exclusive stock-in-trade of defense
counsel or reform-minded legislatures and courts. The police in particular are entitled to the same kind of creative, probing, wide-ranging legal thinking which is not content to concede that, because things
have always been done a certain way in the past, they must continue
to be done in the same way in the future or they cannot be done at
all.lo
10. McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal Identification, 12 WM,
8: MARYL. REv. 235,248 (1970),
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I earnestly hope that we are on the verge of a widening availability to police departments of independent legal counselling by lawyers who are not only thoroughly familiar with police operations but
who at the same time are sensitive to the claims of an ordered system of liberty. It has sometimes seemed to me that if only a fraction
of the talent and ingenuity available to the defense through courtappointed counsel could be directed towards advising the police in
the first instance, then, given a police leadership of similar breadth,
the problems of the administration of criminal justice generally, and
of the courts in particular, would be greatly mitigated. It is clear
that such legal resources must be forthcoming for the police if they
are to be accorded a larger role in the formulation of rules governing their own conduct.
Up to this point in time, of course, that role has been minor to
the point of nonexistence. Everybody, it sometimes seems, makes
rules for the police but the police themselves. Certainly it is true
that, to the extent police conduct in enforcing the criminal law is
subject to explicit prescriptions, these have emanated from sources
external to the police, notably courts and legislatures. This can
doubtless be attributed to a number of factors, e.g., the traditionally
low estate of the police, both in the public eye and their own, the
undercommitment of resources to them, the practice of relying on
the prosecutor's office for legal advice. Notably absent has been any
tradition of the police department as a vital and independent executive agency.
Except in the more rural and less populous parts of the country,
this tradition is changing. The head of the police department of a
major city today is a prominent figure in the governmental scene,
frequently nationally as well as locally, and his force is a large and
highly organized entity. The departments have begun to look and
act more like other large governmental agencies under the discipline
of embodying their principles of action in visible rules. For the present, however, they are largely the recipients of rules from the outside.
Those that come from the courts are in two forms. One consists
of rules formulated as such under judicial rule-making powers and
independently of judicial decisions in particular criminal cases. A
classic example of this form is to be found in what are known as the
Judges' Rules in England.11 These were initially issued in 1912 by
the members of the King's Bench Division of the High Court of
11. [1964] CRIM. L. R.Ev. 166-70 (Appendix A).
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Justice in response, it is of interest to note, to the request of the
police, who wished judicial guidance as to how to proceed in the
interrogation of suspects.12 The Rules, nine in number, deal only
with this subject. They provide in essence for a warning to the
suspect of his right to silence, a requirement that statements made
be reduced to writing, and a prohibition upon cross-examining or
hectoring the suspect for information not freely volunteered. The
warning curiously enough need not be given until the interrogator
has heard enough to cause him to charge the suspect with a crime.13
There is no reference in the Judges' Rules to the right to counsel,
although it is said that a suspect may, if he is sufficiently alert, condition his willingness to talk upon the presence of anyone he wishes,14
In this country a notable example of a nondecisional judicial rule
directed expressly to the police is Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. It requires the police to take an arrested suspect
before a magistrate without "unnecessary delay." In the cases of
McNabb v. United States15 and Mallory v. United States, 16 the Supreme Court put teeth into Rule 5(a) by ruling that evidence seized
in violation of it-that is, during periods of unnecessary delay before
presentment-cannot be admitted at trial.
The McNabb-Mallory rule has given rise to much litigation and
great public controversy, culminating in the enactment by Congress
in 1968 of a statute which forbids the exclusion of evidence on the
ground of delay in presentment so long as such presentment occurs
within six hours of arrest, or even longer if the occasion for the
further delay is reasonable under the circumstances.17 The statute
appears to have had markedly little impact, presumably because of
uncertainty as to whether the Supreme Court views the McNabbMallory exclusionary rule as having, over and above the supervisory
power, a base in the fifth amendment. 18
12. P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 39-40 (1958).
13. Id. at 34. Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v,
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
14. P. DEVLIN, supra note 12, at 41-42.
15. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
16. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
17. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 350l(c), 18 U.S.C. § 850l(c)
(1970).
18. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the statute, and cases decided before
the statute was enacted leave in doubt the question whether the McNabb-Mallory rule
is grounded in the fifth amendment. Compare Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
486 n.12 (1963), with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463 (1966). A number of lower
court opinions have assumed sub silentio the continuing validity and viability of
McNabb-Mallory. See Williams v. United States, 419 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Frazier
v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Others have assumed the validity of
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The second form taken by judicially imposed controls on police
conduct is that of the application in individual cases of a rule excluding evidence acquired in violation of constitutional commands. It
had its inception in the federal courts as long ago as 1914 when the
Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States19 purported to exercise its
supervisory powers to exclude evidence stemming from an unreasonable search and seizure proscribed by the fourth amendment.
The state courts were not disposed to emulate this practice, for
reasons of policy pithily summarized by Chief Judge Cardozo of the
New York Court of Appeals when he said of the exclusionary rule:
"There has been no blinking the consequences. The criminal is to go
free because the constable has blundered."20 This divergence between
the two judicial systems was ended, however, in 1961 when the
Supreme Court included the exclusionary rule in its earlier extension
of the fourth amendment search and seizure limitations to the states.21
In the ensuing decade that process has proceeded apace, with the
result that the exclusionary rule now, in both state and federal
tribunals, stands in the way of evidence tainted by fifth and sixth
amendment violations as well.22
These developments have, in effect, generated many limitations
upon police conduct, and they constitute, in substance and effect, a
body of rules for the regulation of police operations.23 Whatever their
§ 350l(c). See Grooms v. United States, 429 F.2d 839, 843 (8th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226, 1231-37 (9th Cir. 1970).

19. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
20. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
21. Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v•. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
23. The scope of this corpus of exclusionary rules is broad and its contours sometimes esoteric. The general rule of exclusion of illegally seized evidence, Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), is subject to the limitations of state action, Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465 (1921) (evidence illegally seized by private persons not excludable), and
the shifting contours of standing to object. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4l(e); Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). The exclusionary
rules extend to exclude the fruits of evidence illegally seized. Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338 (1939). In some cases, however, the causal connection between the fruits and the
primary illegality may "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). In other cases, evidence which is not strictly
speaking the result of the primary illegality is nevertheless excluded if it was "impelled"
by it. Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968). The exclusionary rules compel the
exclusion of evidence from the government's direct case but permit the evidence for
impeaching the defendant's credibility, at least on matters collateral to the central
issue of the case. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62 (1954). Finally, the exclusionary rules are generally limited to prospective
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intrinsic merit, they do distinguish our criminal jurisprudence
sharply from that of most other countries. In England the Judges'
Rules are looked upon as admonitions intended to be helpful, and
not as mandatory rules for which sanctions will invariably be brought
to bear by the courts in the event of breach. English trial judges do
possess the power to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the
Judges' Rules, but it is a discretionary power infrequently exercised.24
In other areas not involving the interrogation of suspects, the police
are free to proceed as they see fit, except in the case of wire-tapping
where a warrant must first be obtained from an executive official,
the Home Secretary.25 A reason usually advanced for this wide
latitude afforded the police in England is that they have traditionally
acted according to self-imposed standards of restraint and fair play
which make close external supervision unnecessary.26
In Canada improperly acquired evidence is admissible at trial,
and this even includes induced confessions to the extent that other
evidence (including fruits of the confession) is confirmatory of the
confession.27 Israel takes the same approach,28 and Japan has no limitations on admissibility, even in the case of confessions.20 Some countries, while placing no limitations on the admissibility of other
evidence, severely restrict the use of confessions. India, by statute,
requires them to be made in the presence of a magistrate; 30 and
Germany excludes them altogether if the defendant elects to testify
in his own defense.31 Scotland prohibits all interrogation after arrest
application only. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), and cases cited
therein.
24. See Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. R.Ev. 935, 1094 (1966).
As in this country, the English have long excluded demonstrably involuntary confessions
as a matter not in the trial judge's discretion but as a matter of the defendant's right,
The ground for exclusion is not deterrence or prophylaxis, nor even the privilege against
self-incrimination, but the inherent unreliability of confessions not voluntarily given,
See P. DEVLIN, supra note 12, at 38.
25. P. DEVLIN, supra note 12, at 66.
26. Id. at 64. How much the police comply with the Judges' Rules is a matter of
some debate. Lord Devlin maintains that, even without a substantial threat of exclusion, police officers are sensitive to judicial admonitions and criticism. Id. at 27, Others
maintain that the rules are so frequently ignored that they cannot be regarded as an
effective restraint upon the police. See J. SKOLNIK, JUSTICE WITHour TRIAL 66-67 (1966):
authorities cited in 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE § 72 n.20, at 64
(1969); Developments, supra note 24, at 1095.
27. Symposium, The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign Law, 52 J. CR1111. L.C. &: P.S,
271 (1961).
28. Id. at 282.
29: Id. at 284.
30. Indian Evidence Act, 4 India Code pt. II (1956). See generally Developments,
supra note 24, at 1106.
31. Symposium, supra note 27, at 277.
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and excludes all statements (and the fruits thereof) taken in violation
of this restriction. 82 Thus, as was the case in pre-Mapp days in this
country, there are variations abroad in the choices made between the
evidentiary policies of admitting evidence which is reliable in its
indication of guilt, on the one hand, and, on the other, excluding
such evidence as a sanction to deter the future repetition of the conduct by which it was unearthed.
Apart from rules of judicial origin, police conduct is also the
subject of legislative regulation. When the Mallory case, which came
up from the District of Columbia, was decided by the Supreme Court
by reference to Rule 5(a) of the Court's Rules of Criminal Procedure,
a District of Columbia Code requirement of prompt presentment
virtually identical with that required by the Rule had been on the
statute books for many years.88 Rule 5(a) was itself an embodiment of
earlier federal code provisions to the same effect.84 Most states have
similar provisions, although in some the statute undertakes to define
the permissible limits of delay.s 5 There are also many state statutes
prescribing the conditions under which arrests can be made with
and without warrants, and prohibiting certain forms of pressure in
the interrogation of suspects.s 6
The most comprehensive effort yet launched to write a legislative
prescription for police conduct during the period prior to presentment in court is the American Law Institute's current project for a
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. As yet incomplete, drafts
have been prepared which cover virtually every aspect of this critical
period in the relations between police and suspect. Part I deals with
such subjects as the investigative stop and questioning, arrests without warrant, and detention and interrogation prior to presentment.s7
Part II grapples with the intensely difficult subject of searches and
seizures.ss Not yet available even in draft are contemplated provisions
32. In Scotland, reputedly it is even bad form for the police not to advise a suspect
not to say anything. See Manuel v. H.M.A., [1958] Just. Cas. 41, 49 (Scot.); Hardin,
Other Answers: Search and Seizure, Coerced Confessions, and Criminal Trial in Scotland,
113 U. PA. L. REv. 165, 173 (1964).
33. 4 D.C, CODE ANN. § 140 (1967) (R.S. C.D. § 397, Act of July 16, 1862, repealed
July 29, 1970, Pub. L No. 91-358, § 20l(b)(l), tit. II, 84 Stat. 653).
34. Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 415 (repealed by Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 992); Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 595, 48 Stat. 1008 (repealed by Act
of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 862).
35. See statutes collected in ALI, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-AllRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE,
Tentative Draft No. 1, Appendix IV (1966) [hereinafter ALI CoDE].
36. See statutes collected in ALI CODE, supra note 35, Tentative Draft No. 1,
Appendix V.
37. ALI CODE, supra note 35, Tentative Draft No. 1.
38. ALI CoDE, supra note 35, Tentative Drafts Nos. 3 &: 4 (1971).
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for direct penalties for violations of the Code's substantive provisions
-a subject pregnant with significance for the future of the indirect
sanction of the exclusionary rule. 89 Thus far, the drafts have made a
place for the exclusionary sanction, but under conditions of flexibility
in application which have been largely absent from court decisions. 40
In its tentative and unfinished form, there can be no final and
informed judgment as yet as to how successful this effort will be to
provide a satisfactory and acceptable regimen for a legislature to
prescribe for the police. There are obvious advantages in the legislative approach ove:r the judicial. Decisional rule-making can occur
only in the sporadic context of individual cases. The Code approach
permits the whole area to be surveyed at once, with the result that
the provisions made for various parts of the process can be related to,
and made consistent with, each other. And, before the Code becomes
law in any state, it will have to run the gamut of public legislative
hearings in which all interested and informed persons can be heard,
as contrasted with the immediate parties to a criminal prosecution.
The making of rules externally for police conduct suffers from
two principal limitations. One is the absence of direct police involvement in the process. The other is the question of appropriate sanctions to assure their enforcement. The two obviously interact upon
each other. It is a psychological truism that self-regulation tends to
command a higher degree of observance by the regulated, if for no
other reason than that the reasonableness of the resulting command
is more self-evident. The police may be something of a special problem in this regard, but they are not exempt from the impulses and
motivations which shape human conduct generally. Increased responsibility to order one's mm conduct normally evokes a heightened
39. ALI CODE, supra note 35, Proposed Tentative Draft No. I, art. 10; Proposed
Tentative Draft No. 3, art. 9.
40. The provisions of Tentative Draft No. 1, art. 9, for example, apply to exclude
statements and their evidentiary fruits obtained in violation of Part I of the Code.
Unlike the exclusionary rule as it now exists, however, provisions exist for the "cure" of
certain violations. See § 9.03. Other minor violations do not lead to the exclusion of
statements which are made in the presence of counsel. See §§ 9.01-.07. Under § 9.09
fruits of illegally obtained statements are inadmissible "unless the court finds that
exclusion of such evidence is not necessary to deter violations of [the] Code." Finally,
§ 9.10 provides that violations which are "excusable under the circumstances" do not
lead to exclusion.
The sanctions of Tentative Draft No. 4, § 8.02 apply to exclude evidence obtained
in violation of the search and seizure provisions of Part II of the Code, but operate
only if the court finds the violation to be "substantial" (§ 8.02(2)); or in the case of
fruits, if the court does not find that "such evidence would probably have been
discovered by law enforcement authorities irrespective of such search or seizure, and
••• that exclusion of such evidence is not necessary to deter violations of [the] Code,"
(§ 8.02(3)).
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sense of obligation in performance. The police, organized in a semimilitary tradition, work in that tradition's responsiveness to going
by the book, which is always less grudging if one has had a role in
·writing the book. The physical structure of the police is also directed
towards discipline for failure to follow explicit commands from
above.
In the matter of sanctions, it is important to note that the mode
of enforcement of external rules has been almost entirely indirect in
its incidence. The erring policeman rarely has had visited upon himself any penalty for his infraction. He may, indeed, never even know
that, at a trial held many months after an arrest, his handling of the
matter has led to a reversal or an acquittal. This is because the only
sanction of any significance for the breaking of the external rules
has, up to this point at any rate, been the exclusion of evidence
obtained in an improper manner.
The ever-widening reach of the exclusionary rule has not been
paralleled by growing confidence in its effectiveness in achieving one
of its nvo professed purposes, namely, the deterrence for the future of
police methods which the courts have put beyond the pale.41 Professor Oaks, the author of the most intensive survey of this effectiveness, ends essentially with the conclusion that the evidence does not
admit of an acceptable conclusion one way or the other. He describes
his own state of mind as tending towards the replacement of the rule,
although he is not prepared to urge that step just yet. 42
The Chief Justice of the United States, in an opinion earlier this
year, pronounced himself to be of a similar view. 43 Justice Harlan,
in one of his last expressions while on the Court, unequivocally
recommended the overruling of Mapp in order to lift the constitutional burden of the exclusionary rule from the backs of the state
courts.44 What the future portends for the rule is cloudy, but, as
the Supreme Court finds itself in one of its great cycles of change
in terms of its personnel, it would be rash to assert that the rule, at
least as a constitutional command, is not in jeopardy.
41. The literature on the exclusionary rule is extensive. For a bibliography of some
of the writings critical of the rule, see the appendix to Chief Justice Burger's dissent
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 426-27 (1971). For a summary
of the principal arguments against the rule, see Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and
Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 255 (1961).
42. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. R.Ev.
665 (1970).
43. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, J.,
dissenting). See also Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1
(1964).
44. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490, 491 (1971) (concurring opinion).
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This is so, it may be said, because, bereft of demonstrable proof
that the rule in fact accomplishes its purpose to deter, it rests uneasily,
at least in popular estimation, upon its other foundation of an
imperative of judicial integrity. In articulating that concept, the
Court has in substance said that, even if the exclusion of otherwise
reliable evidence of guilt cannot deter improper police conduct, the
judiciary cannot knowingly countenance or reward it.4G There is a
serious question, however, as to whether this legal principle commands sufficient popular acquiescence to make it viable for any sustained period of time, especially in an era of public anxiety about
rising levels of crime. The layman finds it difficult to grasp, and
many lawyers think the highest integrity of the adjudicative aspect of
the criminal process lies in the separation of the guilty from the
innocent on the basis of all the relevant evidence available.40
In the present climate, therefore, one does not have to declare
himself uncompromisingly for or against the exclusionary rule to
justify an inquiry into feasible alternatives. Its most devoted adherents may find themselves whistling in the dark in failing to do so.
My own inclination is to think that the exclusionary rule has had
important consequences in terms of the elevation of police standards
of conduct and that, even if the rule were to be abolished tomorrow,
we would, because of it, be left on a markedly higher plateau of police
performance with respect to the treatment of suspects.
It is this supposition that emboldens me to think that one alternative worth exploring is greater participation by the police in the
making of rules for their own guidance, and greater reliance concomitantly upon the police for the internal enforcement of such rules.
To the extent that this could prove to be not merely an idle fancy, it
embraces the prospect not only of progressively higher elevations in
the quality of police performance, but also of relieving the courts of
the necessity of seeming to obscure the search for truth by rejecting
reliable evidence.
Some may think it quixotic even to speculate about an improvement in police performance and attitude, at least in the foreseeable
future, commensurate with this possibility; and they may perhaps
be right. There are, nevertheless, some omens of a new era. In New
45. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961).
46. Indeed, how firmly the exclusionary rule is grounded on the principle of judicial
integrity, even in the view of the Supreme Court, is open to question. The fact that
most of the rules have been given only prospective application suggests at least a
primary emphasis on deterrence. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969);
Link.letter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). See also notes 83-89 infra and accompanying
text.
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York City, Commissioner Murphy recently met with a group of five
law professors and offered them full access to the Department's
records for purposes of scholarly research.47 For what has traditionally
been a closed society, this is an almost unbelievable development.
The drive on corruption within the force mounted by Commissioner
Murphy bodes well for the internal enforcement of other rules. The
District of Columbia is another place where the advent of forwardlooking leadership has altered the familiar image, and gives promise
of a new style of operation for the future.
There may be other such examples of the winds of change blowing in such unlikely quarters as the police, as I am sure there are
plenty of places where the old attitudes and the old ways of doing
things show no signs of crumbling. But it would be unfortunate if
the idea of police rule-making were dismissed as so much wishful
thinking, on the grounds that the police can be trusted neither to
make good rules nor to enforce them if made. Police officials have
on occasion demonstrated less than professional qualities, but they
are not unique in that respect. And, given the emotion-charged and
isolated conditions in which individual policemen operate, one
should not minimize the difficulties of enforcing rules in a major
police department.
It is because the difficulties are so great, and because the police
are so central to the chances for improving our system of criminal
justice, that we need able men in positions of leadership in our police
departments-men who are sensitive to the need for reconciling
effective law enforcement with the protection of suspects' rights. It
is true that without such men the outlook for the success of police
rule-making is obscured. But it is also true that if proposals such as
police rule-making must be dismissed out of hand because there are
no such men presently in our police departments or willing to serve,
then we are very badly off-so much so, indeed, that a handful of
judges, attempting to control police behavior indirectly and haphazardly, face a formidable undertaking.
In any event, there is no suggestion under the police rule-making
approach that the courts either could or should abdicate their ultimate responsibilities to protect the privacy and to safeguard the
liberty of the individual. The last word as to the propriety of policemade rules always remains with the judicial branch; and that protects
the integrity of the judicial process against frustration by police
failures.
47. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1971, at 47, col. 1.
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In the last analysis, of course, the case for police rule-making does
not rest solely upon the prospects for improvement in police performance. Indeed, the poorer the performance, the greater the need
for rules, since the worst of all worlds is a benighted department
exercising the maximum discretion under invisible standards. There
will be many false starts in the making by the police of their own
rules, and the initial invalidation rate on judicial review may be high.
The important thing is that there be movement towards a system in
which the police are obliged to embody their operational policy
determinations in formal rules for all to see. That way lies a chance
to achieve both greater freedom from oppression for the individual
and greater security for society.

III. THE POTENTIAL OF SELF-REGULATION
The timeliness of an exploration of greater participation by the
police in the formulation of rules for their own conduct derives from
a number of considerations. One is the growing disenchantment,
shared by some of the most sympathetic observers, with the effectiveness of externally originated rules to achieve their purposes. This is
especially true of rules of judicial origin, which are conceived in the
context of specific cases reaching the courts for adjudication. No less
a friend of individual rights than Professor Anthony Amsterdam has
recently recognized the limited reach in practical terms of even the
landmark decisions of the Supreme Court relating to fair and equitable criminal procedures.48
The judges obviously have greater capabilities to elevate the
criminal process from and after the point at which judicial authority
attaches; and they have scored impressive successes in that regard.
It is the projection of that authority to earlier stages, including policecitizen confrontations in circumstances never eventuating in formal
prosecutions, that is in trouble.
Professor Kenneth Davis, in his justified concern about the wide
area of justice committed to the discretion of public officials, persuasively points to the police as a compelling example of this forbidding phenomenon.49 He argues eloquently for analogizing the
police function to that of other agencies which are avowedly making
and implementing policies having a major impact upon the public.
It is his submission that the police should, accordingly, be required
48. Amsterdam, supra note 8.
49. K. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 81-96.

March 1972]

Rule-Making and the Police

677

to emulate such agencies by articulating their policies in visible
form. He would extend the full panoply of the administrative process,
including formal rule-making and judicial review, to police policy
formulation.
There are a number of respects in which the utilization by the
police of formal rule-making procedures might secure the advantages
normally characterizing the administrative process. One is the provision of flexibility. Professor Herbert Packer has commented on the
rigidity which inheres in the conditions under which courts make
rules in the first instance:
Nobody else is exerting control over the law enforcement process, so
the justices think that they must. But they can do so, in state cases
at any rate, only in the discharge of their duty to construe the Constitution in cases that come before them. And so, the rules of the
criminal process, which ought to be the subject of flexible inquiry
and adjustment by law-making bodies having the institutional capacity to deal ·with them, are evolved through a process that its warmest defenders recognize as to some extent awkward and inept: the
rules become "constitutionalized.''t1o
Rule-making cannot, of course, give the police the flexibility to
violate constitutional commands. But the Supreme Court itself has
recognized the proposition stated by Professor Alfred Hill, namely,
that "[e]ven when, in the apparent absence of alternatives, a procedural rule is held to be constitutionally required, it may cease to be
so if suitable alternatives are developed, or if other measures have
eliminated or brought under control the evil at which it is aimed.''51
The Court, in holding that the sixth amendment required the
presence of counsel for the suspect when he was being viewed in a
lineup, went on to say that such a requirement might not be imperative if, by "[l]egislative or other regulations, such as those of local
police departments," the risks of undue suggestibility are eliminated.52
Thus, even under the shadow of constitutional commands, there
is room for experimentation in law enforcement methods; and the
administrative agency model is a demonstrably effective means of
pursuing such a pragmatic course. The Task Force Report on the
Police of the President's Commission on Crime has identified the
58. Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 238,
240 (1966).
51. Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 CoLUi.r. L. R.Ev. 181 (1969).
52. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967).

678

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 70:659

advantage of flexibility as one to be gained through "the mature
participation of the police, as a responsible administrative agency, in
the development and implementation of law enforcement policies."li3
A second advantage inherent in the administrative process, which
might be obtained in the law enforcement context, is the application
of expertise on a continuous and systematic basis. Courts, when formulating rules in the first instance, are not endowed with this
specialized knowledge and experience. Their interventions are necessarily of a random nature, shaped by reference only to the facts of the
individual cases which reach them for adjudication. La·wyers striving
for victory in adversary litigation cannot be expected invariably to
put "the individual case in the context of the overall enforcement
policy involved." 54 The judges, accordingly, may not grasp fully the
wider implications and consequences of the rules they promulgate
within the four comers of the isolated record before them.
Perhaps this concept can be given concreteness by reference to a
recent experience of my court which demonstrates the vacuum in
which judges are currently called upon to act. In an appeal from a
conviction for a federal narcotics offense, the case for the government
rested upon the admissibility in evidence of heroin capsules found
upon the person of the defendant after he had been arrested late at
night for a violation of the motor vehicle laws,lili Precisely what the
officer did or saw when he took custody of the defendant as the latter
emerged from his car was unclear from the record.
The prosecution was prepared to assume on appeal, however, that
there had been a full-scale search of the person; and it pressed us to
embrace a general rule that the police may properly do this in the
case of any lawful arrest, even though the crime for which the arrest
is made is complete and there is no occasion to search for evidence
of it. The policy justification advanced was that such a rule is essential to the personal safety of the arresting officer. It was said that,
under circumstances in which the officer must maintain custody until
the arrestee is delivered to the station house, and in the light of the
realities of modem weaponry, a mere frisk is not sufficient.
These representations were made solely by the prosecutor. The
police command itself had formulated no formal rule to this effect
for observance by their men, and there was not before us any indication as to whether, or why, the police authorities felt such a rule to be
53. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE, supra note 8, at 19.
54. LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Malting and
Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REv. 987, 1006 (1965).
55. United States v. Robinson, 447 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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necessary. We had no way of knowing if the police were following
an invisible rule of searching all persons arrested under similar
circumstances, or whether this was an isolated incident reflecting a
policy determination by the individual officer, as distinct from his
superiors.
There were not before us the elements essential to the exercise of
sound judgment in the formulation of a legal rule of general applicability. We would have been infinitely better equipped for that
task if the police department, in proceedings analogous to general
rule-making, had explored the considerations relevant to such a rule
and had made a conscious and reasoned determination with respect
to it. Without that, our own decisional processes were operating in
a void of contending legal abstractions where the public interest
could be seen but dimly, if at all.
Legislatures, cognizant of their own limitations in respect of detailed fact-gathering, specialized experience, and sluggish response to
changing conditions, have turned increasingly to the administrative
agency. If it be true, as Professor Goldstein has said, that even the
legislatures' ability "to gather facts, to elicit public opinion, and to
act in a manner which is subject to later adjustment" is overtaxed by
"the infinite variety of complex situations which confront the police
today," 56 how much more so is this the case in respect of the courts.
It is important to emphasize at this point, however, that no responsible proponent of police rule-making is suggesting the abdication by either court or legislature of any role in scrutinizing its
results. That would be an untenable position so long as we live under
a constitutional framework of government. What is contemplated is
that the police, in the classic tradition of administrative law, have a
larger share in devising the rules for the governance of their own conduct in the first instance, with ultimate amenability to the commands
of constitution and statute as interpreted and enforced by the courts
in a reviewing stance. That, I believe, would represent a major improvement over the present situation as manifested in the case which
I have just cited to you, in which our court was asked to be the rule
maker of first instance in a field in which we had little expertise.
Over and above the advantages which have been thought to exist
in the administrative process in all contexts, there are considerations
peculiar to the functioning of the police which argue for its merits
in this narrower setting. The points of contact between the police
and the citizen are of infinite variety. Many of them-indeed most56. Goldstein, supra note 8, at 1129, 1130.
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are neither directed towards gathering evidence of specific crimes, nor
do they eventuate in prosecutions. There is a wide range of police
practices, with potentially severe impact upon the citizen, which
never come to the notice of the courts.57 The promulgation of formal rules relating to these operations offers the prospect of greater
control of police activities presently unrestrained by external scrutiny.
Moreover, with respect both to police activities which are presently unregulated by courts, and police activities which are presently
regulated through the exclusionary rule, police rule-making offers
the possibility of defining-really for the first time-the rights of suspects. As Professor Amsterdam has observed, the exclusionary rule
does not define the suspect's rights. It says, rather, that if a particular right is not respected, evidence thereafter accumulated may not
be used at a trial. The Miranda rule does not say that a suspect in
custody has a right to telephone a lawyer. It says only that, if he is
not permitted to do so and a confession follows thereafter, that confession is unavailing for purposes of his prosecution. But what about
the suspect who never confesses but still would have liked to call his
lawyer? So, concludes Professor Amsterdam, the formulation by the
police of detailed rules for the treatment of suspects could well provide "what the courts have never been able to supply: comprehensive and coherent definition of the rights of suspects, together with
procedures for assuring that they are respected.''li 8
The point is not an unimportant one; and it is not too facilely
to be assumed that the ·writing of rules by the police will inevitably
be niggardly and regressive in the statement of positive rights. There
is something about the very process of having to write down on paper
detailed guidelines for one's conduct· which summons rationality
and elevates principle. This is especially true if the process is highly
visible and if the rule-maker is held accountable for the results; and
police rule-making will serve the objectives of visibility and accountability. The making of policy by the single patrolman on the beat,
of which Professor Davis so rightly complains, uo will be transferred
to the highest echelons of leadership where it belongs. Certainly it
is more likely that sensitivity to individual rights will be present in
57. See Oaks, supra note 42, at 720.
58. Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 812.
59. The system is atrociously unsound under which an individual policeman has
unguided discretionary power to weigh social values in an individual case and
make a final decision as to governmental policy for that case, despite a statute to
the contrary, without review by any other authority, without recording the facts
he finds, without stating reasons, and without relating one case to another.
K. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 88.
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a process in which rules are visibly made by responsible police chiefs,
aided by lawyers sensitive to the highest traditions of the profession,
than in a process in which individual policemen are left to deal with
suspects on their own.
It is also possible that police rule-making will have immediate
implications for the effective administration of discipline within the
police departments. Internal sanctions for departures from norms of
conduct depend upon precise and prior identification of what those
norms are. 60 And there should obviously be less reluctance by command authorities to punish infractions of rules formulated by those
authorities themselves as compared with standards imposed from
without. More effective departmental discipline, along with the transfer of policy-making responsibilities to the upper levels of police
leadership, should also contribute to the realization of a greater degree of uniformity in law enforcement practices--a virtue which appears sadly lacking under a system where the differing values and
judgments of individual police officers are uninhibited by official
pronouncements of the policies to be observed.
In the last analysis, it is the visibility of the administrative rulemaking process which is its greatest virtue. Without it, the police
have never been compelled to recognize the degree to which their
daily operations involve policy decisions of the greatest significance
to the community. Nor have they been obliged to reach a conscious
decision as to whether familiar ways of doing things, which appeal
to them as effective, are compatible with overriding values generally
comprehended within our concept of a government of laws.61 In its
absence, there has not been the continuous re-examination of established methods, the periodic probing to see if the desired objective
can be achieved through new exercises of ingenuity and imagination
without sacrifice of other social ends, which are the mark of the true
profession. The extension of the administrative process to the police
function would markedly advance the achievement of that status.
It is appropriate, therefore, to tum to the questions of (1) the
60. The Crime Commission Task Force Report describes the existing situation:
Lacking a formulated policy and thus a preannounced basis for internal
disci:plinary action, the police administrator is hesitant to impose sanctions upon the individual police officer who acts improperly but whose conduct does not
violate departmental regulations.
• • • The police administrator finds himself caught in a conflict between his desire
to be responsive to a citizen who has reason to complain about a policeman's
behavior and his fear of the reaction of his force to seemingly arbitrary discipline
where there is no clear breach of a preannounced standard of proper conduct.
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE, supra note 8, at 20. See also Goldstein, Administrative
Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police Authority, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 160,
163 (1967).
61. See TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE, supra note 8, at 17.
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manner in which that process might be effectuated by the police, and
(2) how its extension to them may be brought about. In respect of
the former, there is no reason to think that a major police department lacks the resources or the competence to engage in general
rule-making, particularly if its organization includes a legal unit in
the form of a General Counsel's office. The central question to be
faced is the degree of participation in it by the public.
It has been suggested that "[c]itizens' advisory committees could
be consulted at the drafting stages," with final promulgation to be
preceded by circulation of drafts for study and comment or for discussion at public hearings. 62 That public participation through some
such means would be useful seems obvious. It would add a democratic element to law enforcement which has long been absent; it
would strike a new and healthy note of openness in what has characteristically been a largely closed society; and it would cast the widest possible net for new ideas. 63
From the standpoint of the police themselves, there would appear to be benefits from the resulting greater public education in,
and sympathetic understanding of, the many thorny problems involved in law enforcement. Current ignorance of these problems is
at the root of some of the more serious difficulties presently assailing
the police, and any amelioration of it would be in the interest of the
police as well as the public. In most areas of human experience,
greater understanding is a necessary prelude to greater support, and
law enforcement is presumably no exception to this precept.
To my knowledge there is at least one major police department
in the country where a form of rule-making is already in existence,
and that department is in the District of Columbia. Some instructions to patrolmen in the area of criminal law and procedure are
promulgated in the form of mandatory orders which are enforced
through departmental discipline. Those issued thus far deal with
such subjects as automobile searches and identification procedures.
They are communicated to departmental personnel, and the familiarity of the recipients with them is tested on promotional examinations. If such an order is violated, disciplinary proceedings may be
instituted, with the severity of the sanctions invoked geared to the
circumstances of the violation. The sanctions range from official
warnings and reprimands to trial board proceedings directed towards
fines, suspensions, and discharges.
The first drafts of such regulations are developed by the General
Counsel, ordinarily after consultation with the operating divisions.
62, Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 818.
63. See K. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 92-93.
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The first draft is customarily circulated on a personal and confidential basis to various knowledgeable people-prosecutors, defense
counsel, law professors, police administrators, and the like. Subsequent drafts are prepared and circulated throughout the department, with comments invited. A final draft is then submitted to the
Chief of Police and, if approved, is issued in his name. There have
been no public hearings, and the participation from outside the
department has been limited as indicated.
The process thus falls short, in the matter of public participation
through notice and opportunity to be heard, of what would have
been provided in that regard in normal administrative agency rulemaking. But the resulting regulations do, in two significant ways, go
beyond what has been described as the typical legal advisor operation. 64 One is that the operational instructions are made obligatory,
and the other is that they have manifested an apparent willingness to
address problems in advance of judicial or legislative mandates, as in
the case concerning pre-trial identification which I mentioned yesterday. 65 For a voluntary system, these innovations are not inconsiderable; and the courts, at the least, are provided the reference point of
a careful and detailed articulation of policy by the police as to how
field operations are to be carried on.
The District of Columbia example is relevant to the second question posed above, namely, the means by which the rule-making process is to be extended to the police. It indicates that there are no
apparent impediments to a voluntary undertaking by the police to
proceed by rule-making in the agency tradition. It does not establish, in and of itself, that there is any likelihood that other police
departments will emulate that example. Professor Davis has voiced
pessimism on this score, and his doubts, in what he refers to as "the
present climate of opinion," extend to the imminence of legislative
action to place the police in the administrative agency mould by
subjecting them to statutes comparable to the federal Administrative Procedure Act.66 If his forebodings are plausible, as they well
may be, it is pertinent to inquire what powers the courts may have
to bring about this seemingly desirable result.
There is, of course, always the possibility that judicial expressions
like that of the Supreme Court in Wade, suggesting that police regulations are an alternative to rules fashioned by the courts even in the
constitutional sphere, may eventually bear fruit. They offer the police an escape from the constitutional straitjacket, and provide an in64. E.g., Jorgenson 8c Levine, The Police Legal Advisor, 45 FLA. B.J. 66 (1971).
65. See text following note 8 supra.
66. K. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 95.

684

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 70:659

centive for self-regulation as opposed to the imposition of rules from
without by less expert and experienced sources. It is hard to see why
this avenue is not an inviting one, but it may be that it takes unusually broad-gauged police leadership to discern its merits and to
make the requisite effort. It is easier to go on complaining about
judicial interference to a public largely unaware that the courts
themselves have suggested this means of deliverance. 67
There remains the interesting, albeit presently unresolvable,
question of whether the judicial power could be exerted to compel
the police to proceed by rule-making. Any argument to that end
would presumably begin by recognizing the formidable nature of
the impact which the police can and do have on the lives of their
fellow citizens. With a virtual monopoly of force and the authority
to use it when needed, it is perhaps not far-fetched to assert, as Professor Amsterdam has, that such extraordinary powers should always
be under the aegis of visible rules for their exercise, and that the
failure of the police to impose this restraint upon themselves, at least
in respect of individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution, would
in itself raise due process problems. 68
That particular constitutional concept has long embraced a requirement that agencies which have rules must observe them. In a
recent application of this principle, the Fourth Circuit reversed a
conviction for this reason, saying that it was of no significance that
the agency procedures violated were "more generous than the Constitution requires." 69 It quoted with approval an observation of the
Second Circuit that departures from agency rules" 'cannot be reconciled with the fundamental principle that ours is a government of
laws, not men' "; 70 and it emphasized that, in the case before it, the
agency had expressly justified the rules in question as ensuring "uniformity" in the protection of personal rights.
If a court is warranted in insisting that, in order to have a gov67. If the maximum benefits are to be obtained from police rule-making, of course,
the system should not be conceived solely as a means of escaping the constitutional
straitjacket. Ideally, the rule makers should not attempt merely to define the constitutionally permissible boundaries of police action, but should rather weigh competing
interests and policies and, when appropriate, write rules which restrict police conduct
more stringently than would the Constitution alone.
68. Due process of law comports the command that public agencies-particularly
an agency such as the police, which possesses broad and virtually monopolistic
powers to use force and restraint upon the citizenry-act according to uniform,
visible and regular rules of law. When the extraordinary powers of the police arc
used unconstrainedly-that is, in the absence of such rules-they arc used arbitrarily
in a constitutional sense, in violation of due process. Such rule-less police actions
may also violate standards established by state law for all administrative action,
Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 814 (footnote omitted),
69. United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 812 (4th Cir. 1970),
70. 420 F.2d at 812, quoting Hammand v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 715 (2d Cir, 1968),
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emment of laws, an agency rigorously adhere to the rules it has, it
may not be too long a step to regard an agency operating without
rules as in a lawless posture. The Fourth Circuit has moved in this
direction in a case involving prison administration, saying:
Courts are not called upon and have no desire to lay down detailed codes for the conduct of penal institutions, state or federal ....
[But] [w]here the lack of effective supervisory procedures exposes
men to the capricious imposition of added punishment, due process
and Eighth Amendment questions inevitably arise. 71

And there are cases where the trial courts, confronted with substantial violations by the police of civil rights, have commanded the police to draw up written plans and instructions governing the conduct
of members of the force. 72
These last are instances of ad hoc directions by the courts to the
police to make rules, and they have occurred in the context of widespread actual violation of individual rights of constitutional magnitude. They are, admittedly, a far cry from the exercise of judicial
power to require the making of rules in advance of such violations
or which embody self-denying restraints not constitutionally compelled. But they stress the importance to the liberties of the citizen
of there being precise police rules in existence. As recognition of
that importance widens, which it appears to be presently doing, it
would be premature to predict that they will never be perceived by
the courts as an imperative of due process or as an assurance that
the public is receiving the uniformity of treatment at the hands of
the police inherent in the concept of equal protection.73
If the administrative model should prevail in respect of police
operations, and general rule-making come to be a familiar element
in the police scene, consideration must be given to the role of the
courts in that scheme of things. It is obvious that the mere fact of
rule-making is no guarantee that the rules made will in all respects
be consonant with constitutional or statutory standards.74 Neither
71. Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 1966).
72. See, e.g., Hicks v. Knight, IO RACE REL. L. REP. 1504 (E.D. La. 1965), in which
a city commissioner of public safety and a chief of police were ordered, under penalty
of contempt, to adopt and publish a plan for police coverage of picketing and demonstrations in the city. In conjunction with this, they were directed to "[d]evelop and
adopt in writing a set of specific instructions as to the duties of individual police officers
and police supervisors in executing the plan," and to "[a]dopt in writing a plan for
instituting disciplinary action against any police officer of the City ••• who refused
••• to know and perform ••• [his] assignment under the plan." IO RACE REL. L. REP.
at 1507-08. See also Cunningham v. Grenada School Dist., 11 RACE REL. L. REP. 1776
(N.D. Miss. 1966); Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional
Police Conduct, 78 YALE LJ. 143 (1968).
73. See Comment, Equal Protection as a Defense to Selective Law Enforcement by
Police Officials, 14 J. PUB. L. 223 (1965).
74. It would, of course, be desirable for courts to be able to review police regnlations
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does the existence of valid rules mean that they will never be ignored
or violated. The courts remain to make such determinations and to
prescribe their consequences. They continue to be, as before, the
ultimate shield of the citizen from the improper actions of his government. The relevant inquiry is as to the reconstruction of the role
of the courts so that they can more effectively review police conduct
by reference to rationally conceived prior rules, as distinct from
formulating such rules in the first instance.
A first question in this regard has to do with the timing of the
review. May police rules, upon promulgation, be judicially examined
before they are implemented, or will the inquiry into validity come
only upon challenge by a particular criminal defendant in the course
of his prosecution? The former course has increasingly become a
characteristic of general administrative law, and would appear to
have significant advantages in respect of police rule-making. 7G
There is, first, the desirability, in these times of congested dockets,
of reducing the number of individual criminal appeals as much as
possible. If a police practice embodied in a general rule withstands
scrutiny by the courts promptly after issuance, defense attorneys will
have no basis for filing repeated criminal appeals incorporating the
same challenge. A second advantage is that pre-implementation review would enable the courts to examine a broader range of police
practices. This includes those which do not normally produce evidence and which do not, therefore, come to light in a criminal trial.
These very practices may, however, have substantial impact upon
rights of privacy and the inherent dignity of the individual.
A third consideration emerges from what has been described as
a weakness of the present system of judicial review, namely, that it
represents "a decision about the propriety of the actions of the individual officer rather than a review of departmental administrative
policy." 76 Pre-implementation review would shift the focus from inwith respect to statutory, as well as constitutional, standards. Statutory standards,
which exist with respect to virtually every other administrative agency, both democratize
control of administrative action and make control more effective, by providing greater
specificity than is found in the Constitution. In light of the common characterization
of the police function as "executive," rather than "legislative," the absence of statutory
standards may not give rise to delegation problems. But it is certainly true that provision of guiding standards for law enforcement would be a worthwhile subject for legislative activity; and a system of police rule-making, by casting the police in the light of
the administrative model, might provide an impetus in that direction.
75. As is commonly the case with other administrative agencies, the sequence might
be: (1) rule-making proceedings, followed by (2) judicial review of the proposed rules,
upon proper petition by interested parties, followed by (3) implementation of the rules,
to the extent that they are approved by the courts. The first step, it should be noted,
refers to final agency action; it may, of course, be desirable to have an administrative
review procedure within police departments.
76. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE, supra note 8, at 31.
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dividual derelictions to department-wide policies; and surely it is the
latter which is the more vital concern of the courts.77 It is also true
that a first essential of adequate administration of discipline within
the police department is the early establishment of the illegality of
the conduct sought to be punished. If there are clear definitions of
proper police conduct which have successfully survived challenge in
the courts, the police administrator is immeasurably strengthened in
his capacity to secure adherence to those definitions by the prospect
of departmental discipline.78
Lastly, improper police activity is, even apart from conviction of
crime, frequently irreparable in a literal sense. It entails limitations
upon freedom of movement and invasions of privacy for which there
are virtually no means of redress. Thus it is important that rules liable to such defects be examined as quickly as possible and their
implementation prevented. Pre-implementation review would serve
this interest to a degree necessarily wanting in piecemeal challenges
by individual defendants.
Indeed, it would appear that the availability of pre-implementation review is important if, in the matter of sanctions, police rulemaking is to offer a possible alternative to the exclusionary rule. If
objections may only be made in individual prosecutions, the judge
77. Although police administrators might be expected effectively to discipline their
subordinates, it is less likely that they can objectively review department-wide official
policy. As Professor Goldstein has written, supra note 60, at 164:
Existing control mechanisms, designed as they are to control individual behavior,
cannot adequately perform the quite different and more complex task of exposing
and reviewing enforcement policies and practices .••• However strongly committed
an agency may be to disciplining the conduct of its employees, it is not likely to
criticize the actions of an officer which, though of questionable legality, are in
accord with a practice knowingly and consciously engaged in by the agency.
This suggests that department-wide policies, as distinct from the individual conduct
of police officers, can be adeqµately controlled only from outside a police department.
78. Under the present system, a police administrator who is confronted with action
of dubious propriety by a subordinate often does not know whether the conduct is
legal, and cannot know until after a defendant challenges the action in his trial. This
fact may hinder effective departmental discipline in two respects. First, the administrator may be reluctant to appear to his men to be restraining them in the absence of
any "need" to do so, i.e., the conduct may be perfectly legal. And, second, if the
administrator believes that the conduct is effective in apprehending lawbreakers, he
may want to allow his men to continue to act accordingly, in the hope that a court
will eventually give its approval.
If, however, there is a clear definition of the boundary of proper police conduct
in the form of a police regulation to which a court has given its approval prior to
implementation, the administrator might not be so hesitant to institute disciplinary
proceedings. So long as a clear standard of conduct has been breached, his men could
not question the propriety of punishment. And, even if he regarded the conduct as
effective, there would be no reason to avoid disciplining the offender. If he believed
that such conduct should be permitted in the future, his proper course would be to
reopen rule-making proceedings and present to a reviewing court a proposed regulation
which authorized the conduct. Punishment of the officer for breach of the prior rule
would be neither inconsistent with the subsequent rule-making proceedings, nor "prejudicial" to the administrator's case in court when the revised regulation is reviewed.
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must impose the only sanction he has-exclusion of evidence-if
there is to be any incentive to identify and attack questionable rules.
Thus, pre-implementation review may not only decrease the incidence of unlawful infringement of citizens' rights by the police, but
also advance the public interest in convicting the guilty.
The virtues of pre-implementation review of the product of police rule-making are plainly evident. What is not perhaps so clear is
the question of judicial power to grant such review at the instance of
a party who has not yet become the object of the rules he seeks to
attack. The issues are the familiar ones of standing and ripeness,
with the latter being of predominant concem.79
In the federal judicial system, the case-or-controversy requirement of the Constitution might seem to interpose a barrier. But the
shadow of United Public Workers v. Mitchell 80 is arguably not so
long as it once was, particularly in the context of state, as opposed to
federal, action.81 And the patent interest of the courts themselves in
having the aid of police-made rules as guides to decision in the quicksands of the criminal field would undoubtedly find expression in a
willingness to go to the outermost limits of judicial ingenuity in
finding jurisdiction to review.
The critical issue with respect to police rule-making, as it is for
rules made for the police by courts and legislatures, is that of the
79. An argument to the effect that there is not sufficient personal interest (standing)
on which to ground jurisdiction in the case of pre-implementation review of proposed
police regulations would center on the fact that events would not have matured
(ripened) sufficiently so that it could be determined exactly which persons will be
adversely affected. Standing and ripeness would, in other words, be the same issue; the
former would be subsumed by the latter.
80. 330 U.S. 75 (1947). See also International Longshoremen v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222
(1954). Mitchell concerned the petition of several federal employees for a declaratory
judgment that the Hatch Act prohibition against political campaigning could not be
applied to them consistently with the first amendment. The Supreme Court held that
the petitioners' mere allegations of intent to perform various acts apparently within
the statute's prohibitions did not create a case or controversy.
81. See Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Note, The Supreme Court, 1951
Term, 66 HARV. L. REV. 89, 121 (1952); III K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 21.06 (1958). Furthermore, even if Mitchell is assumed to be viable precedent, it would
appear not to bar pre-implementation review of police regulations covering a wide range
of police practices. Mitchell cannot be read as holding that there is no case or contro•
versy until sanctions are actually applied against an individual, since such a reading
would abolish declaratory judgments. Rather, a petitioner under Mitchell may some•
times have to put himself within the scope of a statute or regulation, so that il
authorizes sanctions to be applied to him, before his challenge to the statute or
regulation can amount to a case or controversy. Under that interpretation of Mitchell,
regulations covering a wide range of police practices would be reviewable at the pre•
implementation stage, namely, those regulations covering police conduct subsequent
to arrest or indictment. After a suspect has been arrested or indicted (whichever occurs
first), he is in a position in which the police are authorized to act against his personal
interests, just as the Civil Service Commission might have been authorized to act against
the personal interests of the employees in Mitchell if they had in fact performed the
acts which they alleged an intent to perform.
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sanction for violation. If exclusion of reliable evidence attributable
to the violation is to remain, then the police may well resist rulemaking as likely to be a trap of their own contriving. They would,
assuming the duty of rule-making is thrust upon them, at the least
be tempted to keep their rules closely confined within minimum
constitutional requirements, as distinct from placing limitations
upon themselves not commanded by court or legislature. If police
rule-making is to realize the maximum potential benefits, however,
it should not be limited to what the courts have prescribed as minimum constitutional requirements. Constitutions do not embody all
of the identifiable principles of action making for the greatest degree
of fairness to the suspect or the most reasonable assurance that the
guilty will be convicted. There is a wide range of procedural alternatives below the constitutional level which can contribute to
these ends.
The future of police rule-making is, theµ, intimately interwoven
with the future of the exclusionary rule. It is therefore essential to
inquire as to the possible effect of a system of formal rules, made
and enforced by the police, on the exclusionary rule, and as to
whether there is a distinction, in that connection, between violations
of constitutional requirements, on the one hand, and, on the other,
violations of regulations founded upon considerations not dictated
by constitutional commands.
In the former case-violations of constitutional requirements,
whether or not embodied in regulations-there is room for: argument
as to whether the exclusionary rule, as it has thus far been conceived,
represents an immutable constitutional requirement in the sense
that there is a personal constitutional right never to be convicted
by means of evidence acquired under certain conditions. Conversely,
it may be looked upon as a flexible device which, at its inception, is
justified as the only foreseeable means of preserving certain constitutional values, and one which loses its imperative character if alternative means of providing that protection come into being. In the
identification cases,82 the Supreme Court in terms contemplated the
latter approach. In other applications, its language has been cast in
a more rigid mould. The effect of police rule-making on presently
existing exclusionary rules, in short, will depend upon the purposes
of the exclusionary sanction, and the potential of police rule-making
as an alternative means for achieving them.
If the exclusionary rule has no legal foundation in anything other
than the purpose of the courts to deter future violations of the governing rules, then perhaps the matter could be resolved quite simply.
82. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967).
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The judges might say in effect to the police: If you can satisfy us
that you are doing everything you can to reduce the incidence of
violations through meaningful disciplinary action, we will no longer
need to seek deterrence through the indirect sanction of exclusion.83
This would be a sensible approach, since direct discipline imposed
by the police internally is far more likely to deter than remote exclusions of evidence in criminal trials. Whether it is an available
one, however, depends on the accuracy of the underlying premise
that the exclusionary rule is rooted in nothing more than a deterrent
purpose. That is a proposition which, in the current state of the
cases, does not lend itself comfortably to dogmatic assertion.
The answer, of course, may lie in the concept that there is not
one exclusionary rule but several, depending upon the precise nature of the constitutional provision being immediately implemented.
A look at the fourth and fifth amendments is instructive in this regard. The former is addressed to the act of search and seizure, and
is formulated in language suggesting preoccupation with the values
of privacy, which are damaged by the unreasonable intrusion even
though the resulting evidence, if any, is never used. It may be argued,
accordingly, that the exclusionary rule emanating from the fourth
amendment is not a personal right to the exclusion of evidence but
is, rather, a means of regulating official conduct at the time when it
occurs. The fifth amendment, on the other hand, is addressed to the
compulsion of testimony; and its focus is upon the use in judicial
proceedings of evidence amounting to such compulsion. It may be,
therefore, that the existence of alternative means of deterring the
conduct giving rise to the evidence does not dissipate the necessity
of keeping out of the trial evidence which in itself puts the defendant in the position of supplying proof against himself.84
Justice Black came close to making this distinction when, in a
recent case, he said that the fifth amendment "directly and explicitly commands its own exclusionary rule." 85 He was unable to glean
such a command from the language of the fourth amendment, although he has been prepared to assume a closer conjunction between
the two amendments for exclusionary purposes than has been visi83. It would be a difficult question as to the point at which police department
discipline was sufficiently effective so that the deterrent rationale for the exclusionary
rule could be cast aside. Regulations are not self-enforcing, and the problems of
discipline in police departments cannot be minimized. See Goldstein, supra note 60,
at 166-67. The burden would be on the police officials to show that their efforts provided
a viable deterrent threat.
84-. See Dershowitz &: Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the
Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1214 (19'71).
85. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 498 (1971) (concurring opinion).
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ble to other members of the Court. 86 This conjunction is not
self-evident, however, since it would appear that the ban on self-incrimination may be operative without reference to the question of
whether the evidence was come by through either legal or illegal
means.
In any event, it may be true that police regulations resting upon
the fifth amendment must inevitably invoke the exclusionary sanction, whereas violations of those geared to the fourth need not invariably do so. And it is the use of the exclusionary rule in the search
and seizure field which currently is presenting the courts with the
most difficult and pressing problems, not only of reasoned application but also of public dissatisfaction, since it often results in the exclusion of concededly reliable and, indeed, conclusive evidence of
guilt. Thus it is pertinent to pursue the question of whether the existence of police regulations relating to search and seizure, accompanied
by rigorous departmental discipline for individual violations, would
admit of the relaxation of the exclusionary rule in this area.
In Mapp the Supreme Court articulated as the policy bases of the
exclusionary rule, first and primarily, the deterrence of improper
law enforcement activity, and, second, the imperative of judicial integrity, by which was meant the unseemliness of the countenancing
by courts of improper police conduct. If it be assumed that police
self-regulation will provide a more effective means of achieving deterrence, how far does the second policy stand as a legal barrier to
the abandonment of the exclusionary rule?
Professor Oaks would say, not at all. He argues that the Supreme
Court has on many occasions upheld convictions originating in unlawful police conduct.87 Mainly, however, he relies upon the Court's
decision in Linkletter v. Walker8 8 not to make retroactive the Mapp
extension of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the states.
While the majority in that case did state that deterrence of illegal
police conduct was the "prime purpose" of the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule, it is not clear that the opinion precludes the possibility that there are other important purposes behind the rule, or
that its necessary implication is that the exclusionary rule would be
abolished if the deterrent function were accomplished through other
means.
First, Linkletter made the exclusionary rule operative in cases
not finally disposed of when Mapp was decided, even though the
questioned police conduct occurred prior to Mapp, rendering the
86. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661-62 (1961) (concurring opinion).
87. Oaks, supra note 42, at 669.
88. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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deterrent rationale inapplicable. Second, and more significant, is the
manner in which the Court proceeded in Linkletter after it stated
that retroactive application would not advance the deterrent purpose
of the Mapp rule. The Court did not end the discussion at that
point, as it might have if deterrence were the only purpose behind
the exclusionary rule. Rather, the Court undertook what Justice
Black, in dissent, characterized as a balancing process, in which such
policy factors as the disruption of federal-state relations, the wholesale release of guilty persons, and the burden placed on the federal
courts of trying to determine stale factual issues (with dubious results
in terms of justice either to the accused or the state), loomed larger
than the more intangible imperative of judicial integrity.
What Linkletter does appear to establish is that, at least when the
cornerstone of deterrence is removed, the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not rest upon an unshakeable foundation. The
policy arguments for its employment are subject to being overcome
by countervailing policy arguments for its rejection. The interesting
speculation for present purposes is as to what the nature of those
clashing policy considerations will be seen to be in the matrix of a
thoroughgoing system of police self-regulation.
The "imperative of judicial integrity" has commonly been said
to flow from the ideas that public respect for the courts will be eroded
if they entertain evidence which has been acquired through police
derelictions, and that the reception of such evidence in the judicial
process operates to "legitimize" illegal conduct. The measurement of
the public temper at any one point in time is an inexact process at
best, and one for which the Supreme Court is perhaps not peculiarly
qualified. To assert that public disrespect is the consequence of
failing to exclude othenvise reliable evidence is not to prove the
existence of that state of mind. The contrary assertion, namely, that
the rejection of such evidence creates public disrespect for the courts
may be equally plausible, albeit equally difficult to establish as the
majority bent of public opinion. The truth may be that the prevailing balance on this score fluctuates from time to time, in the manner
of the standing of a presidential hopeful, and that no op.e can be
other than tentative in pronouncing judgment on such a matter.
What does seem clear is that so ethereal a concept as the "imperative of judicial integrity" does not, without more, mandate either
admission or exclusion of reliable evidence improperly come by. The
application of the exclusionary sanction is determined by a weighing
of constitutionally cognizable interests. How far the factor of judicial
integrity enters into this balance of competing values would appear to
depend upon its correspondence, in Justice Holmes's phrase, "with
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the actual feelings and demands of the community, right or wrong."
The assumption upon which this discussion proceeds is, of course,
that there are in existence rules made by the police which are to be
observed by them. A deviation from those rules brings into play
another legal principle of constitutional significance which may or
may not be decisive in respect of the exclusionary rule. Its operation
can be illustrated by the 1969 decision of the Fourth Circuit referred
to above.89 There a conviction for tax fraud was reversed because an
Internal Revenue Service agent violated the Service's established
procedure in criminal investigations by failing to inform the defendant of the purpose of the interview and of his right to retain counsel.
Without deciding that such a procedure had to be followed in the
absence of an agency directive on the subject, and, indeed, assuming
the contrary to be the case, the court concluded that the directive,
once in being, had to be followed.
In reaching this disposition, the Fourth Circuit was well within
the boundaries of settled Supreme Court doctrine, marked out in
many cases. A leading one in the series is United States ex rel. Accardi
v. Shaughnessy, 90 in which an admittedly deportable alien attacked
the validity of his deportation order on the ground that, prior to the
consideration of his application to the Board of Immigration Appeals
for suspension of the order, the Attorney General had issued a list of
"unsavory characters" upon which his name appeared. Departmental
regulations provided that the Board was to exercise its discretion
over applications for suspension, with ultimate review by the Attorney General. The Court held that, even though the Attorney
General had the last word and there was no legal necessity to provide
for intermediate action by the Board, "as long as the regulations
remain operative, the Attorney General denies himself the right to
sidestep the Board or dictate its decision." 91 Consequently, it voided
the deportation order.
This so-called Accardi doctrine reflects a recurring theme that
actions by an agency in violation of its own regulations are to be
given no effect when the personal interests of those subject to agency
action are adversely affected-and this is true whether or not the
action in question would have been proper in default of a regulation
on the subject.92 The rationale derives from the principle, underlying
the concept of due process, that individual interests are to be pro89. United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1970). See text accompanying
notes 69-70 supra.
90. 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
91. 347 U.S. at 267.
92. See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957);
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968).
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tected against governmental action which contravenes express and
visible limitations upon governmental power, even when those limitations are self-imposed and not contemplated by constitution or
statute.
The relevance of this principle to police regulations is readily
apparent. It represents a constitutionally cognizable value which,
although not itself determinative of the question of whether evidence
gathered in defiance of a police rule should be excluded, presumably
would enter into the balancing process by which that question is to
be answered. And it is to be noted that this would be true irrespective
of whether the rule involved constitutional requirements, or only
those of lesser degree which the police had thought it in the public
interest to assume.
The Accardi principle has been formulated in a federal context,
and it may possibly have less significance in a state situation. But
the principle it implements is one which cannot be left wholly out of
account in thinking about the role of the exclusionary sanction in
cases involving evidence having its source in police disregard of their
own rules. The disappearance of the deterrent element, and the discounting of the "imperative of judicial integrity," still leave it as a
point to be reckoned with.
The values on the other side of the ledger are plain to see. Although we are alert to separate the innocent from the guilty, we do
not think the latter should escape the consequences of their acts in
defiance of the social order. Easy escape from criminal consequences
threatens the stability of any society, and usually inflicts the greatest
injury on those least able to insulate themselves from the conditions
in which crime thrives. We think prevention is better than punishment, but we have not yet attained a state of sophistication where the
latter can, with safety either to our physical or moral security, be
dispensed with. At the same time, we believe that obedience to the
law is indivisible, and we reject a double standard for private citizen
and public official. There are consequences to be attached to violations by each, and the lawless enforcement of law is utterly alien to
the premises of our legal system.
The reconciliation of these contending claims is always difficultand no more so than in the matter of the exclusionary rule. The judge
wrestling with these issues is left very much at large, and sees clearly
only the diverging policy factors in the scale before him. At all events,
a new factor will appear in that balance if the police take on the
character of a professional, disciplined, and informed agency, ordering their operations by visible and uniform rules formulated with the
aid of broad community participation.

